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Introduction 
Before the war, the various kinds of financial institutions all had their well-defined 
market segments. The commercial banks catered for business firms and well-off 
individuals, the agricultural banks were mainly active in rural areas, the savings banks 
collected the savings of the average citizen, the postal giro system and the Amsterdam 
municipal giro system took care of an important part of the payments mechanism and 
the mortgage banks also had their own market niche, on the liabilities side at least. 
Insurance companies inhabited as it were another planet. The postwar period started 
off with the demarcation lines between the institutions still pretty well intact. The late 
fifties, though, saw the beginning of a process of diversification and expansion which, 
in the nineties, shows no signs of abating and which has changed the financial scène 
beyond all recognition. The number of separate financial institutions has fallen 
dramatically and demarcation lines between market segments are no longer respected. 
We will describe the process of diversification and increase of scale, sketch the 
development of the payments system and the role it played in the movement to larger 
units and wind up describing how prudential supervision and monetary policy reacted 
to the changing environment. 
The scramble for savings 
The dawn of the post-war period found the commercial banks in an extremely liquid 
position, which Mr Lieftinck's monetary policy did nothing to reduce. As business 
firms had little need for trade credit, being quite liquid themselves, and the banks 
considered medium and long-term investment credit not their bailiwick they had no 
choice but to invest in government debt. It was not until 1954 that the credit supply of 
the commercial banks was again at the pre-war level in real terms and only in 1956 
the private sector overtook the public sector in the banks' credit portfolio (Van der 
Werf 1988 p. 213). 
Dutch banks, apart from Nederlandsche Middenstandsbank (NMB, Netherlands Bank 
for Small to Medium Size Enterprises) and the agricultural cooperative banks, had 
traditionally only been interested in granting short-term credit. NMB for that matter 
only granted medium-term credit to Small to Medium Size Enterprises (SMEs) under 
government guarantees. In order to fill the need for longer-term investment credit, 
the government founded Herstelbank or Recovery Bank in 1945, which also paid out 
war damage recompense. lts share capita! was ƒ 300 million, more than the share 
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capital of the then five big commercial banks combined. The State took ƒ 151 million 
and the remaining ƒ 149 million was taken up by other investors, including commer-
cial banks and institutional investors, who had to be lured by a State guarantee on 
dividends. Still, with the memories of the unhappy involvement in long-term credit in 
the early 1920s still comparatively fresh and fearing that Herstelbank was one more 
step on the way to a socialist economy, the banks and the institutional investors 
participated only reluctantly (Posthuma 1955 p. 25). Herstelbank proved to play a 
useful role, but as commercial banks became more involved in medium-term credit 
and restrictions on stock and bond issues were lifted, the need for the services of 
Herstelbank diminished. Originally set up for a period of 25 years, it was in 1962 
transformed into the Nationale Investeringsbank (National Investment Bank, NEB), 
seeing its capital reduced to only ƒ 100 million. In the 1970s NIB channelled govern-
ment aid to ailing business firms and in the 1980s it developed into an investment 
bank, ending its independent life in 1988 when Amro Bank bought all its shares. 
Herstelbank and other banks in 1951 founded the Export-Financieringsmaatschappij 
(Export Finance Company), which provided longer-term export loans and was quite a 
success, because export credit could be insured against risks with the Nederlandsche 
Credietverzekerings-Maatschappij (Dutch Credit Insurance Company), also established 
in 1951. 
The steadily increasing demand for investment credit and export credit was not fully 
met by Herstelbank and Export-Financieringsmaatschappij. Banks began in the early 
1950s to provide this kind of credit, at first through specialized daughter companies, 
but as these had to fund themselves with relatively expense bonds, the banks took 
over medium-term lending themselves, using their cheaper term deposits. In order to 
keep any mismatch between assets and liabilities resulting from increased medium-
term lending within manageable proportions, the commercial banks in the late 1950s 
became interested in attracting private savings, which were relatively cheap compared 
with bonds. A squeeze on the banks' liquidity ratio also contributed to the banks' 
need for savings deposits. Firstly, net receipts from abroad, an important source of 
liquidity creation during the fifties, dried up in the sixties, as did inflationary finance 
by the government, and secondly, nominal national income started to rise steeply after 
the 1964 wage explosion. This made for an increase in the circulation of note and 
coin, putting the banks' balances with DNB under pressure (see the section on 
monetary policy below). But there were additional reasons for the banks to actively 
try to attract savings. Credit control that only allowed increased lending if it was 
matched with increased funding through longer-term borrowings or share capital also 
fanned the banks' thirst for savings (see the section on monetary policy below). For 
another thing, the fast and continuing increase in real per capita income for the first 
time made the great mass of private individuals interesting as a potential clientèle for 
the commercial banks. 
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The quest for savings deposits spurred the banks on to develop an extensive branch 
network and generally to move into retail banking, which some had already done on a 
small scale in the 1950s, providing consumer credit. If the banks were to succeed in 
Table 1. Shares of different groups of banks in the market for savings. 
1950 1960 1970 1980 1988 
share in per cent  
RPS 32 24 18 14 16 
Savings banks 29 28 25 17 16 
Agricultural banks 37 39 42 41 40 
Commercial banks 1 8 16 28 28 
Source: Bosman 1989 p. 42. 
attracting savings deposits, they had to offer other services as well, which they began 
to do on a large scale in the mid-196'0s. Prominent amongst these was the provision of 
salary payments into bank accounts, which absolved employers from the need to pay 
out their workforce in note and coin. The banks also entered the market for mortgage 
loans, and in 1967 offered interest on demand deposits and provided cheques which 
were guaranteed up to a certain sum, in an attempt to draw clients away from the 
postal giro system or prevent them switching allegiance. Also, these services helped to 
keep the money within the bank circuit and prevent it leaking away through with-
drawals of note and coin. A further service was the introduction of Eurocheques in 
1974, which could be used for payments abroad. 
Not surprisingly, the ones to suffer from this decision of the commercial banks to tap 
the savings market were the savings banks, including Rijkspostspaarbank (RPS), the 
government savings bank (see Table 1). These banks could be seen as institutional 
investors, because their raison d'être was to provide opportunities to save and their 
investment or credit activities were subordinate to the liabilities side of the balance 
sheet. Savings banks usually were small outfits whose scope was local or at the most 
regional and who hardly competed amongst each other (RPS was another matter, 
being part of the Ministry of Transport and having the counters of the post offices at 
its disposal). Being non-profit institutions, usually in the guise of foundations, they 
were not subject to profit taxes. As against this, they were restricted as to the kind of 
activities they were allowed to engage in. In particular, loans to business enterprises 
were forbidden territory. 
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Thanks to the aggressive behaviour of the commercial banks, the quiet in this cosy 
market niche was disturbed around 1960, never to return. The savings banks now had 
to compete head-on with the commercial banks for the savings of the non-rich. The 
consequences for the savings banks were far-reaching. For one thing, given the 
penchant of consumers for one-stop shopping, in financial markets no less than in 
other markets, the savings banks had to broaden the variety of financial services they 
offered. Also, this meant that the commercial banks in effect dictated the interest 
rates that the savings banks could offer, which forced them to revise their investment 
policy. 
As for the increased variety of financial services, savings banks first offered their 
clients the opportunity to use their savings deposits to pay rent, taxes, electricity bills 
etcetera but soon offered full-fledged payments services. Forced by the competition 
from the commercial banks and the postal giro system, they became in effect money-
creating banks. Earlier the high cost of frequent currency payments had made big 
institutions come to an agreement with the Nederlandse Spaarbankbond (Savings 
Banks Union) to pay pensions into people's savings accounts. A government depart-
ment offered this option in 1949, the Dutch railways foliowed in 1951 and when state 
old age pensions for all over-65 were introduced in 1957, recipients could opt for 
receiving it through their savings bank (Buning 1957 p. 99). 
Savings banks traditionally invested in bonds and granted credit to the government. 
With the increased competition for savings, coupled with an increased volatility of 
interest rates in general, the savings banks were confronted with the need to adjust 
credit interest rates with increasing frequency, while debit rates were fixed for 
considerable periods of time. This situation called for investments with a more 
variable rate of interest. As the way to business credit was blocked, mortgages offered 
an attractive alternative. Even if interest rates on mortgage credit could not be 
adjusted as frequently and as easily as the rates on overdrafts, they were not fixed for 
25 or even 40 years, as was the rate on government bonds. For the members of the 
Nederlandse Spaarbankbond collectively the percentage of total assets invested in 
mortgage loans increased from 16.1 in 1950 to 16.7 in 1960, 22.0 in 1970 and 44.2 in 
1980 (Eizenga 1985 pp. 18-19). Given the steadily increasing public sector borrowing 
requirement, this was not for want of new government issues. Even the reduction in 
the maturity of government bonds to as short as seven years in the inflationary 
climate of the 1970s was not sufficiënt to stem this movement. Probably customer 
relations had as much to do with it as interest rate risk, though. 
To sidestep the ban on commercial bank activities and in order to provide their 
clients with a number of services they could not themselves separately provide at a 
reasonable price, a number of savings banks jointly with the German Westdeutsche 
Landesbank Girozentrale and the commercial bank Mees & Hope, who opted out 
after two years, founded the Bank der Bondsspaarbanken (BdB) in 1971. This was 
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registered as a commercial bank and did foreign business and stock trading, partly on 
behalf of the saving banks; it also granted credit to business firms and acted as a kind 
of central bank for the savings banks. In particular, it acted as the clearing institute 
for payments between clients of savings banks and also as a broker in the market for 
private placements. 
Increase of scale 
The survivors 
Although the number of banks had been eroding slowly but surely after the war, the 
only important merger before 1964 was the one between Amsterdatnsche Bank and 
Incasso-Bank in 1948. Then the European Common Market was launched in 1958. 
This led to mergers between business firms and in their wake to a huge increase in 
the demand for medium-term credit by big customers. The banks were more or less 
forced to follow developments in the non-bank business sector, just as they had been 
around the First World War. Medium-term credit outstanding grew from ƒ 114 
million in 1960 to ƒ 5513 million in 1970 (Hoffmann 1971 p. 481; monetary policy 
played a role as well, see below). So Amsterdamsche Bank in 1964 joined forces with 
Rotterdamsche Bank to form Amro Bank and Nederlandsche Handelmaatschappij or 
NHM and Twentsche Bank merged into Algemene Bank Nederland or ABN, which in 
1967 again was joined by Hollandsche Bankunie or HBU. This merger wave cul-
minated in the take-over in 1975 of the merchant bank Pierson, Heldring & Pierson or 
PHP by Amro and the merchant bank Bank Mees & Hope or BMH by ABN, though 
both banks continued operating as separate entities. Of the 126 provincial banks (that 
is banks whose head office was not in Amsterdam or Rotterdam) that existed in 1946 
only 17 were left in 1985, and no one was still independent (Van der Werf 1988 p. 
229). For the big banks takeovers were a means to penetrate the urbanizing country-
side. The process was accelerated by the failure of the small Teixeira de Manos bank 
in 1966, which led to a flight of deposits from small banks to the bigger banks, which 
were seen as more safe. 
Meanwhile, international activities had been gaining importance. Although a 
number of Dutch banks traditionally had had a large overseas business, in particular 
the ABN forerunners NHM (in Asia) and HBU (in Latin America), internationalizati-
on entered a new phase after the European currencies had been made convertible at 
the end of 1958. The banks became more and more involved in activities in inter-
national money and capital markets. In the 1960s and early 1970s international 
cooperation in banking consortia and in syndicates which extended loans to multina-
tional enterprises and less-developed countries, became quite popular. The 1973 oil 
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crisis, which led to huge amounts of money in the hands of oil-exporting countries 
seeking employment, provided a boost to this kind of international lending but at the 
same time planted the seeds of its decline, which was sparked off by the debt crisis of 
the early 1980s. The banking consortia were not very successful anyway. A consortium 
could, for instance, open an office in some country, where all participating banks 
could serve their own clients. But what if such an office succeeded in attracting new 
customers; how to divide the spoils? Furthermore, the participating banks in a loan 
syndicate perhaps too easily expected the syndicate leader to take care of inves-
tigating the soundness of a loan (Frentrop 1987). The disappointing experience with 
loose cooperation constracts led interaationally to a shift in interest from consortia to 
mergers and takeovers. 
With the increasing openness of fïnancial markets in the world, and most of all the 
rapidly approaching integrated European financial market, the Dutch financial world 
became convinced that Dutch banks, even the big ones, were too small to hold their 
own against the international competition. A few of the smaller banks were taken 
over by foreign banks (Slavenburg's by Credit Lyonnais and Nederlandsche Crediet 
Bank by Chase Manhattan) but the experience has not been an entireiy happy one for 
the buyers, as the banks in question had been on the brink of collapse. This will not 
have whetted the appetite of foreign bankers for a takeover of a Dutch bank. 
Attempts at cross-border mergers (between Amro and the Belgian Generale Bank in 
the late 1980s) proved abortive, and so the Dutch banks turned to each other and to 
the financially powerful insurance companies. This was made possible by the lifting of 
the ban on close cooperation between banks and insurance companies as of the first 
of January 1990 and by the monetary authorities' attitude toward bank mergers 
having become significantly more lenient. 
In October 1989 NMB merged with Postbank, though both banks retained their own 
separate branch networks. Postbank was the result of a merger between the postal 
giro system or Postcheque- en Girodienst or PCGD and RPS in 1986 after PCGD 
already had absorbed the Amsterdam municipal giro system in 1979. Though PCGD 
had stolen a march on the banks by introducing computers and offering attractive 
payment facilities around 1962/63 (see the section on the payments mechanism 
below), the banks caught up and made inroads in PCGD's and RPS's territory. PCGD 
and RPS were not free to offer similar services to the banks when the latter develo-
ped retail banking. Legal impediments stood in the way, and for any policy change 
the Minister had to give his consent, or even laws had to be changed. Slowly but 
surely, though, PCGD and RPS broadened their product variety, intensifying their 
cooperation in the process until in 1972 they presented themselves to the public as 
one integrated financial institution. But till 1970 they were, for instance, not allowed 
to follow the banks and offer interest on demand deposits, and not until 1982 they 
were able to buy and sell foreign exchange and sell holiday packages or offer 
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overdraft facilities to business finns. It had been clear for some time that PCGD and 
RPS had to evolve into a full-fledged bank if they were not to perish. After years of 
discussion, the second bill to establish Postbank as an independent firm was introdu-
ced in 1984 and Postbank started work in 1986. The first bill, introduced in 1977, had 
been based on the idea that a privatized Postbank was necessary to increase competi-
tion in the banking industry, an idea which did not go down well with that industry. 
Now the foreninners of Postbank had traditionally invested in public debt and had 
difficulty in entering the more lucrative market for business loans, whilst NMB was 
interested in Postbank's large share in the market for savings deposits and also in 
growth for its own sake, in order to be better able to survive in the post-1992 world. 
Postbank could make use of NMB's expertise in a number of fields, including stock 
investment. lts investment fund, launched in 1990, succeeded in attracting quite a few 
people who had never invested in stocks before. In 1991 NMB-Postbank merged with 
the Nationale-Nederlanden insurance group to become ING-Bank (Internationale 
Nederlanden Groep Bank) in 1992, amongst other things in order to be able to 
become a global player, NMB Bank having entered the international market in the 
mid-1970s. The governrnent, which during the war had taken a 86 per cent share in 
NMB's capital, had been gradually divesting, but after the merger of NMB and the 
fully state-owned Postbank had a 50 per cent stake in the new combine and has 
continued divesting since. In September 1991 Amro and ABN merged in order to be 
able to hold their own on global markets, and in the process cut costs by reducing the 
number of branch offices. The Dutch banking scène is now dominated by three giants, 
the third one being Rabobank. This is the central organization of the agricultural 
cooperative banks, formed in 1972 through a merger of the two then existing central 
organizations. These two, one of them strongly Roman-Catholic, had more or less 
carved up the country between them but were increasingly unable to avoid serving the 
same neighbourhoods. Consequently, they had come under pressure to merge from 
local banks which saw themselves pitted against each other. Also, a merger was called 
for in order to cut costs and still retain the dense branch network necessary for 
attracting savings (de Vries 1973 pp. 207, 223-4). As the agricultural population has 
been shrinking over the decades, the agricultural cooperative banks have also turned 
to the urban market and have extended their services to non-agricultural firms, in 
particular SMEs. Rabobank in 1990 took a 100 per cent interest in the Interpolis 
insurance company, which in 1991 merged with another insurance company, Avéro 
Centraal Beheer Groep. 
One may wonder what made mergers between banks and insurance companies so 
appealing to those involved. For banks, insurance companies are attractive because 
they have large amounts of money available, so that funding will become cheaper and 
more funds become available for large-scale medium and long-term investments. 
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Moreover, an alliance with a wealthy insurance company may help improve a bank's 
standing on the capital market, again making for lower funding costs. For another 
thing, it was feit that bank share prices were relatively low. Mergers with insurance 
companies were seen as a means to avert raiders. Finally, teaming up with insurance 
companies would give the bank access to a large range of insurance products, which 
could be offered to a bank's clients in order to make available a full range of 
financial products and keep its work force busy. For insurance companies, alliances 
with banks mean that a large number of sales outlets became available, with costs 
lower than with independent intermediaries or own agents (Böttcher 1990). As 
insurance polices become more standardized and fierce competition eats into profit 
margins, the importance of a large number of outlets, even if not all staffed with 
insurance specialists, has been increasing. Also, there was a well-founded fear that 
banks might develop their own insurance products. 
The problematic standing of some banks' shares on the capital market and the 
related low share prices were a legacy of the difficult times experienced in the early 
1980s, when the banks were saddled with bad debt resulting from the post-second-oil-
crisis slump. This contributed to disintermediation. First-class borrowers were able to 
attract funds directly from investors at lower interest rates than the banks and 
therefore bypassed the banks (cf Eijgenhuijsen, Koelewijn and Visser 1987 p. 52). The 
banks reacted to this loss by introducing new services, generating commission instead 
of interest income. 
Still struggling 
For the savings banks life has become difficult. Savings banks have traditionally been 
quite small. When they became exposed to the chili winds of competition small-sized 
operations no longer were viable and a process of concentration set in. One-stop 
shopping meant that savings banks had to develop into financial supermarkets and in 
order to satisfactorily help their clients they had to resort to automation. The high 
set-up costs of automation and the scale economies involved are one reason for 
concentration. A related reason was, and is, that new technical developments work 
against banks with only a local or regional presence. Bank clients wish to have access 
to cash dispensers all over the country, for example. As a result, out of the hundreds 
of savings banks that even in 1960 still existed (266 in fact), few remain. Through 
mergers, two large-scale operations have been formed, Verenigde Spaarbank or VSB, 
which teamed up with the AMEV insurance company in 1990 and jointly with the 
Belgian insurance company formed Fortis Groep, and SNS Bank. AMEV had been 
feeling a need for its branches abroad to cooperate with banks and the lack of know-
how in this area had made itself feit. For VSB a merger was attractive because it 
would enable the bank to broaden its product range and, perhaps more important, 
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because it was seen as a fast way to expand to regions of the country not previously 
covered (Gerards and Schipper 1989). With two relatively big organizations and only 
a handful of smaller savings banks left, no separate role was left for BdB. SNS Bank, 
which had a majority share to start with, absorbed it in 1991. 
The savings banks have lost their role as the principal refuge for nickel-and-dime 
savers. They have to compete on equal terms with other fïnancial institutions, which 
implies that they should not be given special privileges. Savings banks had been 
exempt from profit tax. As from 1969 a new law restricted the exemption and a 1984 
law altogether abolished it, albeit with a transition period of 13 years. Against this, 
they have entered the commercial overdraft loan market, however cagily. Their 
natural habitat is made up of SMEs, non-profit organizations and the professions, but 
it has proved far from easy to wrest a slice of this market from well-established 
competitors who have more know-how. Mortgage loans may help to reduce interest 
rate risk, overdraft loans are much better in this respect of course. Also, overdraft 
loans may help prevent extreme fluctuations in a bank's liquidity position. If salaries 
are paid into the accounts of a bank's customers at the end of every month it is better 
to have the business firms that pay the salaries and are the beneficiaries of return 
flows of money during the next monthly period as clients as well. Over a month total 
liabilities of a bank are much more stable in such a situation, and on average a 
smaller fraction of assets has to be held in liquid form. The savings banks face an 
additional disadvantage vis-a-vis the commercial banks in that private clients are not 
yet charged for the costs of running the payments system and savings banks have a 
disproportionate percentage of private clients as against business clients. The end 
result is a sorry tale of steadily declining market shares. While the savings banks have 
been trying to develop into full-fledged commercial banks, others launched new 
attacks on their (and the other banks') savings reservoir, making life even more 
difficult for them. The Robeco investment company founded its Roparco daughter in 
1981. Roparco offers a relatively high interest rate whilst savers can dispose quite 
freely over their money instead of giving up disposability for a certain period or 
having to pay a penalty in case of withdrawing money. Roparco has been able to offer 
such favourable terms because, though registered as a commercial bank, it only 
accepts payments into its accounts or withdrawals from its accounts through accounts 
that people hold with other banks. Its operating costs are consequently low. 
One way to survive is to offer products that others don't. An interesting phenome-
non in this respect is the development of ethical banking. Algemene Spaarbank voor 
Nederland (ASN) distinguishes itself by the ethical norms it applies in its investments 
(bonds and private placements). It does not invest in firms doing trade with countries 
with a poor human rights record or in firms that produce weaponry. ASN is one of 
three banks connected with the trade union movement who in 1990 combined with 
two insurance companies to form the Reaal Groep, z group that lacks coherence and 
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was left again in 1992 by one of the banks. Another ideological bank is Triodos Bank, 
which bases itself on anthroposophic ideas and aims at stimulating new kinds of 
initiatives, such as ecologically sound investments. 
The victims 
If savings banks have been reduced in number and fight a bitter battle for survival 
and commercial banks have merged and combined with insurance companies, 
mortgage banks had no choice but to throw in the towel in the early 1980s. Mortgage 
banks specialize in granting credit with mortgages as security. Apart from own funds, 
they initially funded themselves exclusively by issuing mortgage bonds, from the 1950s 
on supplemented by private placements. Mortgage bonds used to differ from other 
bonds in that they were issued on tap, which enabled the mortgage banks to immedia-
tely adjust their credit interest rates to changes in market conditions and the volume 
of their borrowing to the volume of their lending. They were not subject to the so-
called calendrier or calendar, a kind of waiting list for bond issuers administered by 
DNB with a view to preventing disruptions of the bond market which was in force 
from 1946 till the deregulation of the Dutch capital market in 1986 (cf the section on 
monetary policy below). Furthermore, in contrast to other bonds, under an agreement 
with the Vereniging voor de Effectenhandel (Stock Brokers Association) mortgage 
bonds can be sold directly by the issuers to the public through their own branches or 
through commercial banks, bypassing the Stock Exchange. Against this, mortgage 
banks were not allowed to attract funds from the public for periods shorter than two 
years. 
The first ten years or so after the war were disappointing for the mortgage banks, 
as the housing market was subject to rent controls and dominated by government-
financed housing corporations and local councils. Things brightened up when the 
government, in an effort to stimulate home-ownership, as of the lst of June 1956 
began to grant subsidies to owner-occupiers of new-built houses and enabled local 
authorities to provide mortgage guarantees. This last measure made it possible for 
financiers to lend up to 90 per cent, instead of 65 or 70 per cent, of the building costs. 
Though providing a fillip to the activities of the mortgage banks, this measure sowed 
the seed of later difficulties. The availability of government guarantees meant that 
specialized knowledge of the housing market was no longer a prerequisite for survival 
in the mortgage loan business. Home owners who defaulted on their debt payments 
would be bailed out by the government and nothing was gained by the financier if he 
had an accurate idea of the value of a house in the case of foreclosure. As it happe-
ned, this made it attractive for other banks to enter the home loan market and so 
contributed to the ultimate foundering of the independent mortgage banks. It should 
be noted that, apart from mortgage banks operating in the real estate sector, there 
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have been ship mortgage banks, which in 1971 were accepted as members of the 
Association. 
With their loan business to home owners thriving, in the 1960s some of the big 
mortgage banks, to wit Friesch-Gromngse Hypotheekbank or FGH and the Westland 
and Utrecht mortgage banks (after their merger in 1969 the Westland-Utrecht Hypo-
theekbank or WUH) started to branch out into various real-estate activities, including 
property development, investment for their own account and, in the case of FGH, 
real estate agency. Such activities could not be financed through mortgage bonds, as 
these had to be backed by mortgages. It was hoped that this diversification would 
bring a measure of risk-spreading, but these hopes were dashed when the real-estate 
crunch came around 1980. This foliowed after a boom which had started in 1975 and 
was fuelled by high inflation, lagging interest rates and high inflation expectations. All 
this had made real estate look like a safe investment and made prices soar. When the 
boom burst and both demand for and prices of real estate feil precipitously in 1979 
and the following years mortgage banks feit the crunch of increased competition. 
Commercial banks and savings banks had the edge on interest rates, as they could 
fund themselves with relatively cheap savings deposits. life insurance companies and 
pension funds, also active in housing finance, did not have to pay high interest rates 
to attract funds either. To pile on the agony, the mortgage banks lost their monopoly 
of issues on tap. As from 1981, commercial banks have been allowed to issue 
bankbrieven, which are bonds issued on tap by banks. Initially these were restricted to 
a total of ƒ 500 million a year for all the commercial banks together, but as from 
1987 no restrictions apply. The commercial banks naturally have been more interested 
in selling their own product than in selling a similar product issued by mortgage 
banks. Worst of all, the mortgage banks got bad publicity as it emerged that they had 
overexpanded and had to shed personnel and reduce the number of branche offices. 
Mortgage bonds could only be sold at increasingly higher yields as compared to other 
bonds, if indeed they could be sold at all. WUH attempted to safeguard funding by 
selling mortgage loans to the Algemeen Burgerlijk Pensioenfonds (ABP, the civil 
servants' pension fund), which would bring in slightly over ƒ 3 billion over the period 
1981 through 1983. High supply of WUH mortgage bonds in the secondary market 
depressed prices in 1981, increasing effective yields to dizzying levels. DNB initiated a 
safety net in order to maintain orderly market conditions. This failed to prevent 
losses, in large part from the property development sector, cumulating and in 1982 
DNB lifted its ban on banks and insurance companies buying into mortgage banks 
ABP supplied subordinated loans and, more important, the Nationale-Nederlanden 
insurance company acquired preference shares, both to the tune of ƒ 150 million. 
DNB helped finance a foundation specially set up in 1983 to take over bad loans 
from WUH. Nonetheless, further aid proved necessary and in 1986 WUH became a 
wholly-owned daughter of Nationale-Nederlanden. Similarly, FGH had to be rescued 
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by a financial injection from RPS in 1983 and by further participations in 1986 from 
Postbank and the Aegon insurance company. After new losses had been run up in 
1986, Aegon took over FGH in 1987. Postbank opted out because it still was a 
government agency and was not allowed by the Minister of Finance to become 
heavily involved in a private mortgage bank: the conservative liberal party and the 
christian democrats in Parliament feared that foreign investors would react negatively 
to a takeover by a state bank (Mulder 1987 p. 64). 
The big two among the independent mortgage banks found a safe haven with 
insurance companies. No such luck befell Tilburgsche Hypotheekbank, a small outfit 
that had made big loans to borrowers of dubious reputation and had taken recourse 
to counterfeit surveys of real estate in order to justify their loans. As a coUapse of 
Tilburgsche would severely damage the whole industry, the big three, FGH, WUH 
and Rabohypotheekbank after some prodding by DNB furnished Tilburgsche with an ƒ 
18 million subordinated convertible loan. But to no avail. Nobody was interested in 
taking over the Tilburgsche and in August 1983 it was declared bankrupt. The healthy 
parts of the estate were then bought by the Ennia insurance company, which later 
became part of Aegon. 
The biggest mortgage bank, Rabohypotheekbank, which came into being in 1975 
through a merger of Boerenhypotheekbank and Raiffeisenhypotheekbank, was little 
affected by the trials and tribulations of other mortgage banks. For one thing, they 
had restricted themselves to the core business of mortgage banks. Also, they had less 
difficulty selling their mortgage bonds and attracting private placements than other 
mortgage banks, because of the high repute of the Rabobank group of which they wre 
a part and which guaranteed their liabilities. They took over Nederlandse Scheeps-
hypotheekbank (Dutch Ship Mortgage Bank), which with mortgage bonds in disrepute 
faced insurmountable difficulties in funding themselves, in 1986. As the other 
remaining independent mortgage bank, Friesch-Hollandsche Hypotheekbank, had 
already been taken over by the AMEV for the same reason, this marked the end of 
the era of independent mortgage banks. 
None of the independent mortgage banks proved able to weather the storms of the 
early 1980s. Even without the shocks in the real estate market around 1980 it is 
doubtful whether the independent mortgage banks could have survived much longer 
than they actually did (cf Koelewijn 1987, Voute 1989). In a capital market where the 
government left increasingly diminishing space for other borrowers, funding became 
increasingly harder and more expensive and there is little reason to believe that the 
mortgage banks would have been able to hold their own not only against the govern-
ment as a big borrower, but also against the commercial banks, cooperative banks 
and savings banks, which had the advantage of cheap funding through savings 
deposits, while the commercial banks also intruded into the territory of tap-issued 
bonds. The loss of their sheltered niche on the capital market combined with 
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increased competition on the home loan market, in particular from other banks and 
RPS with their extensive branch networks, could hardly have failed to turn their 
profits into losses. 
The payments mechanism 
In the passage on the concentration movement among savings banks the importance 
of technological developments in the payments mechanism was already hinted at. The 
payments mechanism was for a long time a subject on which the banks and PCGD 
carefïïlly avoided to come to an agreement. Already before the war attempts had 
been made by the banks to introducé a payments system that would provide a 
cheaper alternative to payments by cheque, which were subject to stamp duty. On a 
small scale this Bankiersgiro (Bankers' Giro) started mnctioning in December 1937, 
but it did not really pull off. The system was cumbersome and payments took quite a 
time to effect, because there were no less than 25 clearing banks in the system. 
Participating banks channelled payments through these banks and they in their turn 
cleared any remaining balances via DNB, once a day. In 1944 Kas-Vereeniging started 
another system, and so the Netherlands entered the post-war period with no less than 
five separate payments systems, each using their own forms, and run respectively by 
DNB, PCGD, the Amsterdam Municipal Giro System, Bankiersgiro and the Kas-
Vereeniging's giro. Attempts at holding consultations between PCGD and the Bankers' 
Association on unifying the forms had something of a ritual dance, a very slow one at 
that, and came to grief. The banks were not very forthcoming and PCGD on its part 
wished to retain the system where banks, in order to be able to make payments on 
behalf of their clients, had to keep balances on accounts with PCGD (Wolf 1983 p. 
42). In the meantime business firms started to make increased use of PCGD, because 
automation had made it possible for them to send large numbers of payment orders 
on punch cards or magnetic tapes. On top of that, PCGD had introduced pre-punched 
giro credit slips, which clients of firms and other organizations only had to sign and 
which simplified bookkeeping a great deal. Especially after a number of municipal 
services had strongly advised the public to shift to this method of payment, the banks 
started to make haste (Wolf 1983 p. 43). After all, the number of accounts held with 
PCGD increased threefold between 1960 and 1970, from less than 800.000 to 2V* 
million, doubling again over the next decade (Peekei and Veluwenkamp 1984 p. 14). 
1967 saw the establishment of Bankgirocentrale (bank giro centre or BGC) by the 
commercial banks and the agricultural cooperative banks, who were in 1969 joined by 
the savings banks. BGC processes all giro payments between the several banks and 
those between the participating banks and Postbank. After payments have been 
effected, remaining claims of banks on each other are settled via the banks' accounts 
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held with DNB. This clearing takes place once a day. At the time, such a system only 
existed in Sweden. At last progress was also made in making life for the public easier. 
After eight years of laborious negotiations, the banks and PCGD came to an agree-
ment to introducé common pre-punched giro credit slips (Wolf 1983 p. 63). 
Remittances were made without charge. The banks initially even provided stamp-
free envelopes, if only because the postal giro system had been traditionally doing the 
same. Against the costs of running the payments mechanism the banks received the 
interest returns on loans outstanding, but as the paper work is quite labour intensive 
and interest on loans is uncertain and fluctuating, the costs were more and more feit 
as a burden. This was a major reason for some of the smaller banks to pull out of the 
retail market around 1990. As from 1990 the banks have been introducing charges for 
their payment services, but ever so slowly because of the concerted opposition from 
both consumer and business organizations (even if charges on payment accounts are 
low in comparison with other European countries, cf Jongepier 1991). DNB by 
contrast strongly supports the banks in this respect, out of concern with their financial 
health. 
Even if PCGD via Postbank has become part of a commercial bank, the postal giro 
system and BGC have not yet been integrated. Payments from accounts held in one 
system to accounts held in the other are possible, but time-consuming. One integrated 
system would of course be preferable. The then Minister of Finance, Dr Duisenberg, 
in 1975 gave orders to investigate how to integrate the two payment systems, but it 
will probably take till the turn of the century before integration will be effected. 
The developments described all served to increase the attractiveness of bank money 
vis-a-vis currency. A further step along this road has been the introduction of 
EFTPOS (Electronic Fund Transfer at Point of Sale). This has only been spreading 
slowly, though, because business firms tend to consider the costs charged them too 
high. 
Supervision 
Unlike some other countries, such as Belgium and Germany, in the Netherlands the 
central bank is charged not only with monetary policy but also with prudential 
supervision. Monetary policy is concerned with keeping the value of the guilder 
steady, both in terms of other currencies (in practice the Deutschmark) and in terms 
of purchasing power. Prudential supervision is concerned with protecting the banks' 
creditors. After the war, supervision was still based on a 1932 regulation, which did 
not give DNB much grip on the banks. This changed after the Wet Toezicht Krediet-
wezen (WTK), based on the 1948 Bank Act, came into force in 1952. It authorized 
DNB to issue rules on capital-asset ratios and liquidity ratios. A third branch of policy 
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was so-called stmcture policy, aimed at preventing too mighty financial combines 
coming into existence. In particular, banks and insurance companies were not allowed 
to hold significant amounts of each others shares. The difficulties in the mortgage 
bank sector in the early 1980s led to the first weakening of this principle, and with the 
approach of the integrated European financial market it was to all practical purposes 
discarded in January 1990. The only restriction now is that banks and insurance 
companies should remain separate legal entities, but there are no objections from the 
monetary authorities to banks and insurance companies being in one holding. With 
both banks and insurance companies in the same holding, DNB remains responsible 
for prudential supervision on the banking leg and the Verzekeringskamer (Insurance 
Chamber) for supervision on the insurance leg. This is quite different from prudential 
supervision on banks. With insurance companies, it is not capital-asset ratios that 
count, but the relationship between income and future obligations on the one hand 
and own capital on the other. It is to be expected that DNB and the Verzekeringska-
mer will have to cooperate ever closer in the future in order to redress or prevent 
unfair competition, as banks sell insurance policies and insurance companies sell 
banking products, in particular mortgage loans. 
National rules as to supervision are more and more shaped or even superseded by 
those of international agencies. In 1989 the EC passed the Second Banking Directive, 
to which national laws have to be adapted as of the first of January, 1993, at the 
latest. This guideline opens up all national financial markets of the member states to 
the financial institutions of all member states. A credit institution from a member 
state after that date may open a branch office or provide cross-border services in any 
oher member state. It may offer the same kind of services abroad as it is entitled to 
offer in its home market. Each EC country will be responsible for prudential super-
vision of those banks that have their headquarters in that country, applying the 
common capital-adequacy standards, whilst monetary supervision is the province of 
the country where a subsidiary is active. 
International developments forced the Dutch monetary authorities to give up their 
opposition against close ties between banks and insurance companies. They have also 
been opposed to banques d'affaires, i.e., banks heavily involved in non-bank firms 
through share ownership, again out of a concern about concentration of power. WTK 
1978 stipulated that banks should not hold more than five per cent of the share 
capital of another firm, and then only temporarily, unless given special permission. 
Also, a bank is not allowed to invest more than 20 per cent of its own capital in non-
financial firms. DNB had already made an exception in order to enable the banks 
providing capital to SME's. In 1980 the banks got general permission to take a 
minority share in SME's, to a maximum of ƒ 2.5 million and in principle for no longer 
than five years, in 1986 extended to ƒ 4 million and ten years respectively. The 
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provisions of the Second Banking Directive are likely to force the Dutch monetary 
authorities to further soften their stance. 
Prudential supervision cannot mean that the central bank guarantees creditors that 
banks will never fail. That would put a premium on irresponsible behaviour by bank 
managers: if a risky venture succeeds, the spoils are for the bank shareholders and 
managers, if a venture goes sour, the central bank and ultimately the tax payer has to 
pay up. There is thus a moral hazard problem in prudential supervision. The Dutch 
solution, introduced in 1979 with the revised WTK, is that deposits or other registered 
claims of individuals, foundations and associations are guaranteed up to an amount 
that is reviewed every three years (ƒ 40.000,- per individual or institute in the 1989-
1991 period and again for the next three years). Unlike the American system, this is a 
mutual guarantee system. If a bank fails to redeem claims on it, the rest of the Dutch 
banking system will compensate the victims. Again unlike the American system, the 
Dutch solution appears to avoid the moral hazard problem while at the same time 
providing full protection to small depositors. Big depositors and business firms should 
be able to avoid risky banks and if they are lured by high credit interest rates offered 
by little-known financial mstitutions, they must suffer themselves if such a bank fails. 
This fate befell a few Dutch municipalities when the obscure Amsterdam American 
Bank closed its doors in 1981. Prudential supervision does not imply a guarantee by 
DNB to creditors of financial institution. Legal action by creditors of failed financial 
mstitutions (Amsterdam American and Tilburgsche) against DNB therefore were 
bound to come to grief. 
Though the system is satisfactory from the point of view of moral hazard and 
protection to depositors, the distribution of the burdens is perhaps not entirely fair. 
First of all, cautious banks have to pay for the careless ones, which can hardly be 
avoided without changing to another system (for instance, an insurance system with 
premiums dependent on the perceived risk of assets). More seriously, Dutch banks 
suffer if a Dutch daughter, even if itself perfectly sound, of a foreign bank has to 
close its doors as a result of a failure of the mother (de Leeuw 1992). New European 
directives are likely to solve this problem as of 1994. 
Over the years, DNB has extended its supervision to other sectors than the 
commercial banks. WTK 1952 charged DNB with the task to supervise the savings 
banks and prudential supervision was introduced in 1954, when DNB issued directions 
on required liquidity, foliowed in 1958 by directions on capital-asset ratios. Before 
1954 there had already been a degree of self-regulation by the Spaarbankbond. This 
apparently was up to the standards required by DNB, for it was agreed that the 
Spaarbankbond would henceforth supervise the savings banks on behalf of DNB. 
DNB did not take over until 1 January 1990, with the Spaarbankbond still helping to 
collect data from its members. WTK 1978 brought the mortgage banks within the 
compass of DNB's control, effective from the lst of January, 1980. From 1936 
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onwards they had exercised a fonn of self-regulation, over and above supervision 
from RPS. When in 1928 the Centrale Beleggingsraad (Central Investment Council) 
was formed in order to supervise investments on behalf of a number of govemment 
agencies, RPS was charged by this council with supervision on mortgage bonds, which 
they had already done since 1905 on their own initiative. This state of affairs formally 
ended only in 1952 (de Knocke van der Meulen 1981 p. 36). 
Monetary policy 
Minister of Finance Pieter Iieftinck opted for a rather dirigiste policy immediately 
after the war, aimedat keeping interest rates low, and with it the cost of investing 
and the burden of the govemment debt. This could succeed because the capital 
market was strictly controlled. Even all bank loans over ƒ 50.000,- had to be okayed 
by DNB. DNB's status itself was to be changed shortly. Firstly, in 1948 it was nationa-
lized, even if it retained the legal guise of a limited liability company. Secondly, the 
1948 Bank Act, which defined the tasks and the powers of DNB, was passed, with the 
instrurnents at its disposal to be spelled out later in the WTK (1952, revised in 1956 
and 1978). Article 9 charges DNB with safeguarding, as far as possible, the value of 
the guilder, both in terms of purchasing power, i.e., the intemal value of the guilder, 
and in terms of its price expressed in foreign exchange, i.e., the extemal value of the 
guilder. But how should it go about fulfilling these tasks? Traditionally, central banks 
tried to defend the intemal and/or the external value of their currency by influencing 
the money supply or credit conditions through the discount window and open-market 
operations. WTK 1952 gave DNB additional instrurnents, such as the imposition on 
minimum liquidity ratios, credit ceilings and selective credit control (all of which had 
been deployed prior to WTK 1952 coming into effect, on the basis of special arran-
gements). Directly after the war, with the banks superliquid - they were awash with 
Treasury bills, as Mr Iieftinck in his concern for low interest rates made no haste in 
consolidating the Government's floating debt -, there was little scope for discount 
policy. In the period 1952-4 the State took measures to decrease the liquidity of the 
banks, through lengthening the term of the bills to a maximum of twelve years. 1954 
saw the introduction of cash ratios. DNB could compel the banks to keep an interest-
free deposit with DNB as a percentage of their liquid liabilities, to be revised every 
month. In this way, credit expansion by the banks could be kept within bounds. Later 
on, in 1956 and 1957, with balance-of-payments deficits and a continuing increase in 
bank note circulation (both of which were a drain on the banks' liquid assets), the 
banks became more dependent on DNB and as from 1979 it has been customary for 
them to be in the red with DNB, even if during the 1960s the banks' liquidity position 
was improving through inflationary finance by the govemment and private sector 
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balance-of-payments surpluses (van der Werf 1988 p. 211, 215). If the banks are in 
the red DNB has a handle on them. In 1958-60, though, the balance of payments on 
the money account was comfortably in the black. DNB did not want to impose higher 
cash ratios, because that would induce the banks, which had built up a considerable 
volume of foreign assets, to reprattiate these assets, i.e., sell them to DNB. In the 
circumstances, DNB preferred the banks to hold foreign assets, rather than see its 
own foreign currency reserves grow, for reasons of international monetary cooperati-
on. This meant DNB had to give up exclusive reliance on indirect measures, i.e. 
manipulation of the discount rate and the cash ratio, for direct measures, such as 
credit ceilings (de Haan et al. 1981 pp. 78-81). Without abandoning the discount rate 
as an instrument of monetary policy, during the 1961-72 period DNB relied mostly on 
various forms of direct credit control. By and large these implied ceilings on short-
term credit expansion (overdraft loans and loans for periods shorter than two years), 
in 1965 complemented by a rule for the expansion of the volume of longer term loans 
(two years and over) not to exceed the growth of longer-term liabilities (de Roos and 
Renooij 1980 p. 181 ff). This rule meant that the creation of (broad) money through 
medium and long-term credit would be neutralized by a fall in the money supply 
through shifts from money and near-monies into savings deposits, longer-term time 
deposits and bonds. 
The problem with direct controls is that they are not in conformity with market 
forces. In particular, it was feit that credit ceilings, limiting credit expansion by 
individual banks to some percentage increase over the credit volume of a previous 
period, stifled competition. It proved diffïcult to fit the rapidly increasing number of 
foreign banks into the system (Renooij 1979 p. 11). Also, near-banking, i.e. short-term 
credit granting between non-banks, was in this way stimulated, reducing the impact of 
monetary policy measures. WTK 1978 therefore created the opportunity for DNB to 
extend its monetary supervision to the liquidity-creating activities of non-banks (i.e., 
the issue of short-term debt), but not without a Government ordinance. Furthermore, 
as the dividing lines between the various financial institutions became blurred, DNB 
extended its grip over those institutions whose debt had been assuming a more liquid 
character: the savings banks in 1969, PCGD in 1970 and RPS in 1973. Note that this 
concerns monetary policy, not prudential supervision. 
Required liquidity ratios were re-introduced in 1973 but phased out again in 1977 in 
favour of credit ceilings. These ceilings differed from the earlier ones in that DNB did 
not fix an upper limit to the volume of credit, but to the volume of liquidity creation 
through credit granting, be it short-term or long-term. If a bank hit the ceiling, it 
could always increase its lending, provided it also managed to attract new long-term 
funds, such as savings deposits. Any increase in the volume of (broad) money was in 
that way compensated by the fall brought about by converting (broad) money into less 
liquid form. The end result would be an increase in long-term interest rates. 
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The shift to salary payments in hard cash to payments into giro and bank accounts 
that took place in the 1960s led to changes in the composition of the (narrow) money 
supply (see Table 2). Any increase in the currency supply makes the banks more 
dependent on DNB, for if the public wants notes or coin, the banks have to buy these 
on their behalf from DNB and their balances held with DNB fall (coins are issued by 
the Ministry of Finance but brought into circulation by DNB, before 1993 for small 
denominations by the post offices; shifts by the public from bank money into coins 
involve payments by the banks into the account which the Government holds with 
DNB). A falling share of currency in the money supply eases the pressure on the 
banks' balances with DNB and so lessens DNB's hold on them. This is what the banks 
were achieving in the 1960s. Various cash reserve instruments are available, though, 
to keep them in the red and enable DNB to control short interest rates. 
Table 2. Bank money and currency, 1955 - 1990. 
Year Currency Bank money Currency Bank money 
as per cent of national income as per cent of the (narrow) money supplv 
1955 14.4 19.2 43 57 
1960 12.8 15.7 45 55 
1965 12.0 14.0 43 57 
1970 9.0 14.5 38 62 
1975 7.5 16.8 31 69 
1980 7.2 14.3 33 67 
1985 7.5 16.3 32 68 
1990 7.8 18.7 29 71 
Source: DNB Annual Repons. 
For a large pan of the post-war period, DNB attempted to control the domestic price 
level through manipulation of the (broad) money supply and the rate of exchange 
through manipulation of the short interest rate. It was thought that the control of the 
money supply would have a greater impact on long-term rates of interest than on 
short-term rates. The credit ceilings were indeed aimed at influencing long rates and 
with it spending. Short rates then remained available for regulating short-term 
international capital movements and consequently could be used for weakening or 
strengthening the guilder in foreign-exchange markets. To these ends, DNB main-
tained, or even created, a strict division between short-term credit markets and (long-
term) capital markets. Developments in either market should not in any appreciable 
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degree spill over into the other one. Short-term bond issues therefore were forbidden, 
as were bullet loans (loans that are fully redeemed at one fixed date), which, when 
the redemption date draws close, tend to be used as money market paper. Nor could 
commercial paper and negotiable certificates of deposit find favour with DNB. 
After the final breakdown of the Bretton Woods system of fixed-but-adjustable 
parities in 1973, after having tottered and been patched up in 1971, the rate of 
exchange more and more assumed pride of place in monetary policy. Besides, 
international capital movements exploded, increasing the interest-elasticity of capita! 
flows to very high values indeed. All this meant that the use of the interest-rate 
instrument in the attempt to stabilize exchange rates elicited increasingly large capital 
inflows and outflows, which worked out in notable rises and falls of the domestic 
money supply and make an independent money-supply policy illusory. On top of that, 
the liberalization of financial markets in the world marched on. The Netherlands, 
with its large sector of international firms, its important financial cornimmity and its 
concern for the future of Amsterdam as a financial centre, could not afford to remain 
in slow lane and 1986 saw the abolition of the restrictions on the issues of debt 
instruments. The artificial separation between the short-term credit market and the 
capital market is a thing of the past and DNB has effectively given up its attempts to 
control the money supply. Exchange-rate policy now occupies centre stage and a 
stable price level is largely dependent on price developments in the countries whose 
currencies are pegged to each other and to the guilder in the European Monetary 
System. Nonetheless, a money-supply or credit-supply policy cannot entirely be 
dispensed with, because too high a rate of domestic credit creation would cause 
capital exports, either direct or via a fall in interest rates, leading to a fall in the 
foreign-exchange reserves of the central banks and the commercial banks. Ultimately 
confidence in the stability of the guilder would be damaged and investors would 
launch an attack on the guilder. As an aside, maintaining confidence has also been 
the reason for DNB to prefer the short-term interest rate as an instrument for 
exchange-rate policy to direct interventions in the foreign-exchange market, which are 
thought to be more apt to make the market nervous, i.e., make it expect exchange-
rate changes (den Dunnen and de Wilde 1991 p. 13). 
Over the years, DNB's monetary policy, supported by a largely non-inflationary (i.e., 
monetary neutral) fiscal policy and, some would add, by incomes policy, has been 
quite successful in maintaining the external value of the guilder, even if the inflation 
record has been less impressive (see Table 3). True, in 1949, when the pound sterling 
was devalued by 30.5 per cent vis-a-vis the American dollar in September 1949, the 
Netherlands foliowed suit with a devaluation of 30.2 per cent, upping the par value of 
the dollar from ƒ 2.65 to ƒ 3.80. It is a moot point whether this large a devaluation 
was really necessary, and DNB would indeed have settled for a devaluation of about 
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Table 3. Inflation rates 1950-90. 
average average average average 
1950-60 1960-70 1970-80 1980-90 
Netherlands 3.3 5.4 8.4 1.9 
Belgium 2.4 3.6 7.6 4.4 
France 6.4 4.2 9.7 6.1 
Germany (FRG) 3.2 3.2 5.1 2.7 
United KSngdom 4.0 4.1 14.4 5.8 
United States 2.5 2.8 7.1 3.7 
1950-60 calculated as cumulative growth rates firom OECD GNP price indexes taken from A. 
Maddison, Economie Growth in the West, George Allen & Unwin, London 194 p. 45. Other 
periods GDP deflators, source World Development Report 1982,1992. 
24 per cent (Bakker and van Lent 1989 p. 170, but Lieftinck's policy was to keep 
Dutch prices low relative to other countries (pressure from the Minister of Agricul-
ture, S. Mansholt, seems to have played a role as well, see van Lennep and Schoorl 
1991 pp. 45, 144 nt. 4). The liberalization of European trade in 1950 helped to 
translate the devaluation into increased exports, at the cost of some upward pressure 
on the domestic price level. Reasonable inflation rates and mounting eurrent account 
surpluses in Germany (FRG) and the Netherlands together with the wish to keep 
imported inflation at bay led to a revaluation of the Mark and the guilder by five per 
cent in March 1961 (see on this Yeager 1966 p. 418). This caused protests by 
exporters and a general stir hard to imagine for those accustomed to the violent 
exchange-rate changes of the post-1973 period. It proved not enough to offset 
inflation differentials with other countries and can be said to have significantly 
contributed, through high profits and overemployment, to the 1964 wage explosion. In 
the post-Bretton Woods era, a number of European countries cooperated in order to 
narrow exchange rate fluctuations, culminating in the European Monetary System 
(EMS) in 1979. Within the EMS, which is to all practical purposes a system of fïxed-
but-adjustable parities, the Dutch policy has been to follow parity changes of the 
Mark, though the Minister of Finance, H.O.G.R. Ruding, snubbed DNB by only 
partially following the revaluation of the Mark in March 1983. The poor inflation 
record of the 1970s was a result of downward real wage rigidity. Wages were fully 
compensated for the rise of energy prices resulting from the 1973-4 oil crisis, at the 
cost of falling profits and rapidly rising unemployment. Here incomes policy, or the 
lack of it, made DNB's task in fighting inflation a hopeless one. 
Article 26 of the 1948 Bank Act gives DNB a very high degree of independence 
from government interference in the field of monetary policy (as apart from the 
23 
pegging of exchange rates). If the Minister and DNB disagree and do not succeed in 
patching up their differences, the Bank Act provides for a (lengthy) procedure to 
bring DNB on its knees. So far, this procedure has not been used. The independence 
of DNB is jealously guarded, and not without reason for, as former Bank President 
Dr Jelle Zijlstra tells us in nis memoirs, politicians and civil servants penodically try 
to undermine Article 26 (Zijlstra 1992 p. 212 ff). This independence means, among 
other things, that DNB cannot be forced by the Government to finance its deficits. 
The 1948 Bank Act stipulates that the Government has the right to demand interest-
free loans from DNB, subject, though, to a ceiling of only ƒ 150 million. K the 
Government wants more, it must try to conclude an agreement with DNB. Such 
agreements typically restrict borrowing by the State from DNB, i.e. selling Treasury 
bills to them, to a small percentage of the total State budget, basically to bridge 
seasonal fluctuations in the Government's financing needs. 
The aims of stabilizing both the internal and the exteraal value of the guilder are 
not necessarily always compatible. Maintaining stable exchange rates when foreign 
countries suffer from high inflation inevitably leads to imported inflation, and if one 
wants to give priority to stable prices, a floating rate system or periodic revaluations 
are inevitable. The Netherlands have been lucky in that its mam trading partner, the 
German Federal Republic, still haunted by the memory of the hyperinflation of the 
early 1920s, made price stability one of its overriding policy objectives. Linking the 
guilder to the Mark has therefore been a convenient way to fulfill the tasks set by the 
Bank Act. 
If and when the European Central Bank becomes a reality, DNB will lose its sway 
over monetary policy, which anyway is dictated by the Bundesbank, given the 
openness of the economy and the close ties of the Dutch economy with the German 
one. What will remain is its task in prudential supervision. 
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